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16 April 1964

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

1. Desk-level discussion of Soviet general war strategies and theater force capabilities was held at ONE between [redacted] and the undersigned from 1030 to 1200 hours, 16 April 1964.

[redacted] This discussion was at the request of [redacted]

2. [redacted] presented [redacted] Soviet strategy in the event of general war. He assumed a deliberate surprise attack with nuclear weapons after a period of international tension. He further assumed that the Soviets would require a three to one advantage in line divisions prior to any attack. He presented three basic methods by which the Soviets might buildup their forces in East Europe to achieve such a superiority, -- infiltration, under cover of maneuvers and "crash" movement. None of these concepts are new [redacted] left copies of a detailed description of these scenarios for general war with me.

3. In the course of the discussion [redacted] stated the view that "CIA believes that in present circumstances, it is highly unlikely that the Soviets would initiate any kind of a war." He agreed that this is the case, however, he emphasized that this situation is dependent upon the US presence in NATO Europe and on

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US-based nuclear power. He said that the Soviets could calculate a war-winning nuclear attack on Europe alone if US nuclear weapons were excluded from the balance, and that they could calculate a war-winning conventional attack under the umbrella of nuclear deterrence, if NATO conventional forces were weakened. I agreed that this was probably the case, but that such calculations would more likely lead to political than military aggressiveness.

25X1 4. [] requested detailed comments on the studies he left with me, and I agreed to provide them. I requested comments on the classified Soviet military writings which have been forwarded to []

25X1 [] agreed to provide them.

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Lt. Col. USA
EE Staff

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